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The Basle Accord of 1988 regulates how much equity banks must set
aside as a cushion against the default risk. In its 1999 proposal for a new
Accord, the Basle Committee seeks to introduce diﬀerent equity ratios for
customers of diﬀerent risk levels. The proposal strongly favors external
ratings as a means of risk determination. German banks, on the other
hand, demand acknowledgement of their internal ratings.
This paper shows that, even if assumed that banks have better diagno-
sis skill than external rating agencies, external ratings are better able to
implement the goals of the Basle Committee than internal ratings. This
is due to a lack of incentives to truthfully reveal their diagnosis results.
These incentives may be provided by supervision of internal ratings, even
if imperfect and only occasional. However, this requires that a ﬁne be
imposed if the supervising authority comes to a result diﬀerent from the
internal rating assigned by the bank.
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In June 1999, the Basle Committee1 proposed a revision of the Basle Accord,
to become eﬀective in 2004.2 The Accord determines how much equity inter-
nationally active banks must set aside against their loans.3 According to the
Basle Accord of 1988, banks are required to hold 8 percent of their commercial
customers’ loans as equity.4 Obeying a minimum equity ratio is costly since the
banks may thereby forego proﬁtable deposit arrangements.5
The 1988 Basle Accord does not distinguish between customers in business areas
with various levels of risk. This may lead to adverse incentive eﬀects: if the
credit cost burden is the same for high and low risks, and banks charge higher
interest rates for more risky loans, then proﬁt maximizing bank managers are
tempted to replace low-risk customers with high risk customers.
The Basle Committee’s proposal requires a higher equity ratio for loans to high-
risk customers, and a reduced equity ratio for low risk loans. Credits to low-risk
customers less less expensive for the banks, whereas loans to high-risk customers
1The Committee is hosted by the Bank for International Settlements in Basle and consists
of representatives of the central banks and the supervisory authorities of the G10 countries,
plus Switzerland and Luxembourg, see Sheldon (1996a, 709).
2In the meantime, the Basle Committee has announced that the new Accord will not
become eﬀective before the year 2005, see Meister (2001).
3Economist (1999, 100).
4The ﬁgure of 8 percent seems to be a rule of thumb rather than the result of optimization
calculus. The Basle Committee did not give any hint why it is 8 percent instead of, say, 4 or
16 percent, see Blattner (1995, 720). Perfect deposit insurance would only be provided by
an equity ratio of 100 percent. However, this would leave no depositors in the bank’s balance
sheet, see Hellwig (1995, 732f.).
5See Santos (2000, 7) who presents a comprehensive survey on banking regulation.
2become more expensive. In general, the riskiness of a customer is operationalized
by the (expected) probability of a default, which is derived from historical data
or from an evaluation of the project.6
The current discussion focuses on how loan risk should be determined. One way
to make diﬀerent levels of risk comparable is credit rating, i.e. the attempt to
aggregate a large amount of data into one ﬁgure or letter.7 The Basle Committee
and the US authorities prefer external rating agencies8 to do this, whereas
German banks favor internal ratings.9
It is expected that the Basle Committee’s proposal will lead to a considerable
decrease in the average equity requirement.10 Nonetheless, German banks take
the Basle committee’s strong bias towards external ratings as a serious threat.
There are several reasons for this position: the German banks’ desire to maintain
their inﬂuence in the capital markets, the fact that only a few companies in
Germany already hold a costly rating,11 and the idea that German banks have
a close relation with their customers and hence a better knowledge of their
credit worthiness than external rating agencies. In the meantime, the Basle
Committee has published amendments to its proposal that consider internal
ratings more favorable.
From the viewpoint of diagnosis12 theory, however, the original position of the
Basle Committee makes sense. Diagnosis skill, i.e. the ability to distinguish high
from low risk, is only one of the two factors that are crucial to a comparative
analysis of diagnosis institutions. Equally important are the incentives of the
actor who performs the diagnosis. Diagnosis theory shows that it can be rational
to react non-contingently on a diagnosis result, even if the result is based on
superior diagnosis skill. Hence, taking into account the goals of the new Basle
Accord, it might be better for the Committee to rely on the inferior diagnosis
skill of rating agencies which have ﬂawed incentives.
The “second pillar” of the new Basle Accord is the “Supervisory Review Pro-
cess”, according to which a supervising authority evaluates how banks handle
their risk assessments. If the supervisor detects potential risks, he may make
6See B¨ orsen-Zeitung (1999) and Sheldon (1996b). The new proposal does not provide
a clear answer to the question whether an optimal equity ratio scheme for the respective risk-
classes exists. Altman/Saunders (2001) distinguish ﬁve diﬀerent risk-classes and propose
diﬀerent equity ratios for them.
7See Krahnen/Weber (2001, 5). The alternative is the use of risk-management models.
8Such as Standard and Poor or Moody’s. These ﬁrms’ rating standards are available under
www.standardandpoors.com and www.moodys.com.
9See B¨ orsen-Zeitung (1999). Surprisingly, the Basle Committee treats ﬁrms without
rating as medium risks. This part of the proposal is excluded from my analysis.
10German Banks, on the other hand, have estimated that more equity is required than
under the old Accord, see Meister (2001).
11Steltzner (1999). In FAZ (2000), it is estimated that only 40 German ﬁrms hold a
rating, among them no small-and-medium enterprises. An external rating of such a company
would cost about 25.000 Euro per year.
12In the literature, diagnosis is often called “screening”, a term that may lead to confusion
with the concept of screening contracts.
3proposals on how to improve the bank’s risk-management. In exceptional cases,
the supervisor may even demand a bank to hold a higher equity ratio. The
German Bundesbank is quite optimistic that, given this supervision procedure,
internal ratings will have a good chance of ﬁnding acknowledgement.13 How-
ever, the supervisory review process aims only at improving the quality of the
internal ratings and leaves out the banks’ incentives out of focus.14 This paper
presents a diagnosis model that takes into account the diagnosis skill as well
as the incentives of the institution determining an applicant’s credit risk. The
model allows for a comparative analysis of external rating, of internal rating by
a bank’s credit department, and of internal rating combined with supervision
by an authority.
The results of my model show that, even though internal ratings are based on
better knowledge of the customers, this is outweighed by the lack of the banks’
incentive to truthfully reveal their diagnosis results. Thus, in comparison to
internal ratings without supervision, external ratings are better able to imple-
ment the goals of the Basle Accord. Supervision, even if imperfect and only
occasional, may provide the necessary incentives of the bank. However, a pre-
requisite for this is the imposition of a ﬁne for incorrect ratings, a possibility not
yet provided for in the Basle Committee’s proposal. The “Supervisory Review
Process” seems to be insuﬃcient to achieve the necessary impact on the bank’s
incentives.
Three basic assumptions are made in this paper:
• banks have higher diagnosis skill than external institutions such as rating
agencies or supervision authorities;
• external rating agencies or supervision authorities have an incentive to
provide ratings as accurate as possible, whereas this is not necessarily
true for banks;
• it is assumed that the diagnosis results are private information, whereas
the conditions of a credit contract are veriﬁable.
Using this approach, it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss whether
the Basle Accord’s equity requirements or the German banks’ proposal make
sense,15 especially if compared to other means of deposit insurance.16 It is also
beyond the focus of this paper to illustrate how credit-worthiness ratings are (or
13Meister (2000, 3 f.).
14See Deutsche Bundesbank (2001, 31).
15Hellwig (1995, 734 f.) objects that equity rules may fail to work in a dynamic framework,
may cause macroeconomic problems and address the problem of excessive risk-taking only in
a crude and indirect way. Blum (1999) demonstrates, using a two period model, that capital
adequacy requirements may even increase the riskiness of a bank’s credit portfolio. Blattner
(1996), on the other hand, claims that there “is hardly an alternative”.
16Blattner (1995, 720) raises the question whether these means actually are complements
or substitutes.
4should be) performed. The internal incentive problem that might arise between
a bank’s management and its credit department staﬀ is not discussed,17 nor are
the incentives of regulators and supervising institutions,18 nor the macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of the Basle Accord.19
The sole focus of this paper is to analyze which institutional setting is better
suited to the new Basle Accord’s goal of assigning higher equity ratios to higher
risks. My analysis makes use of the insights of diagnosis theory, taking into
account the incentive of proﬁt-maximizing banks. Until now, this aspect seems
to have been neglected in the political debate regarding revision of the Basle
Accord.
2 Internal rating
2.1 Outline of the model
Consider a risk-neutral, price-taking bank that is faced with two types of credit
seeking customers. The loan amount is normalized to one. The probability of
default depends on the true but unknown type of applicant. The bank screens
the credit applicants; the diagnosis result is private information. After the
diagnosis, the bank openly assigns one of two risk classes or rejects the applicant.
Thus, the assigned risk class might deviate from the true diagnosis result, but
when a risk class is assigned, it governs the bank’s returns and credit costs.20
Let t ∈ {H;L} denote the possible types of applicants, where H stands for
a high probability of success (or a low default probability), and L for a low
probability of success. If the customer goes bankrupt, the return to the bank
is assumed to be zero. The bank receives the agreed upon interest rate with
probability qt, with
qH > qL
However, the distribution of the types is known: Type H appears with proba-
bility π; hence the probability of type L is 1−π. If the bank gives credit, there
are two reasons why it has to assign a risk class to the customer:
• the new Basle Accord forces the banks to set aside equity according to the
risk class;
17See, e.g., Feess/Schieble (1999) on this.
18Gehrig (1995, 748) assumes that supervisors have a preference for the prevention of
bankruptcy of banks rather than for the maximization of overall welfare; see also the brief
discussion in Blattner (1995, 720).
19See, e.g., Basle Committee (1999).
20Of course, this models only a highly stylized version of the proposed new Basle Accord.
5• the market interest rates for the two risk classes diﬀer empirically.21
Let d stand for the decision of the bank, with d = {n;l;h}. The assignment of
the high quality risk class, representing a low default risk, is denoted as d = h.
The assignment of the low quality risk class (i.e., a high default risk) is denoted
as d = l. To reject the customer is denoted as d = n. In case of d = l, the
required equity ratio and hence the bank’s credit costs are higher than in case
of d = h. The credit costs are denoted as cd, with
ch < cl
The interest rates are denoted as id, with
ih < il
Since the bank is assumed to be a price-taker, the two interest rates are exoge-
nously given. However, the results to be derived below would hold for any value
of ih and il respectively, as long as the interest rate for the more risky customer
is higher than the one for the less risky one.
I assume that banks are eﬀectively prevented from applying asymmetric combi-
nations of interest rate and credit costs, namely (ch,il) and (cl,ih): if a bank has
assigned a risk class d, this is public information; thus, it can easily be enforced
that interest rate and equity cushion are set in accordance with the assigned
risk class. The only opportunity to act unlawful is to assign a risk-class that
deviates from the actual diagnosis result. Therefore, in this model the banks
discretion is limited to applying either (ch,ih) or (cl,il).
The banks payoﬀ is based on two more factors: the success probability qt, with
t ∈ {H;L}, and the assigned risk class d ∈ {n;h;l}. If the bank rejects the
customer, it does not have to bear credit costs and does not collect interest:
in = cn = 0. Thus, the general formulation for the bank’s payoﬀ is
qtid − cd
Let me deﬁne ∆i = il − ih and ∆c = cl − ch for ease of the exposition. Table1
summarizes the parameters that are relevant to the bank’s decision situation.
Note that the parameters id,qt,π are exogenously given, whereas the parameters
ch and cl belong to the policy instruments used by the Basle Committee to
inﬂuence a bank’s behavior. I deﬁne the average probability of success based on
a prior π as Θ(π), with Θ(π) = πqH + (1 − π)qL.
2.2 Basic model: no diagnosis
I start the analysis of the model by assuming for the moment that the bank
does not screen the applicant. In this case, its decision is based on a simple
21It is observable that the interest rates are higher if the borrower presents a higher risk,
see Machauer/Weber (1998).
6Table 1: Internal rating without diagnosis
applicant’s type t = H t = L
bank’s decision
d = h qHih − ch qLih − ch
d = l qHil − cl qLil − cl
d = n 0 0
expected payoﬀ comparison which can already be derived using the parameters
shown in table 1. The following proposition can easily be proven by comparing
the expected payoﬀs connected to the available options.
Proposition 1: Given id,qt,π,cd with d ∈ {h;l;n},t ∈ {H;L},
cl > ch, il > ih, and qH > qL, then the bank prefers
(1) d = h to d = l ⇔ ∆c > Θ(π)∆i
(2) d = h to d = n ⇔ ch < Θ(π)ih
(3) d = l to d = n ⇔ cl < Θ(π)il







h  n  l
h  l  n
l  h  n l  n  h
n  l  h





7These results are visualized in ﬁgure 1 which shows the bank’s preferred action
for all possible combinations of cl (on the vertical axis) and ch (on the horizontal
axis). E.g., in the two upper left areas (above the diagonal line labeled (1) and
left of the vertical line labeled (2)), d = h is the optimal decision of the bank:
in the uppermost area, h is preferred to n and n is preferred to l, which is
symbolized by h  n  l. In the two lower right areas (below the horizontal
line (3) and below the diagonal line (1)) the optimal decision is d = l. If both
cl and ch are very high (above (3) and to the right of (2)) , then no applicant
will be granted a credit (d = n is optimal).









Note that the three conditions that were derived in Proposition 1 lead to a
partition of the set of possible cl-ch-values, as it is easily visible in ﬁgure 1.
Furthermore, note that if il > ih, then the upwards sloping line in ﬁgure 1
that represents condition (1) in proposition 1 has a positive intercept with the
vertical axis, since Θ(π) = πqH + (1 − π)qL > 0, and slope 1. Therefore, the
intersection of the three lines in ﬁgure 1, representing the three conditions in
Proposition 1, lies always above the 45o-line, i.e. the area where cl > ch. Figure
2 is a simpliﬁed version of ﬁgure 1, showing only the optimal decision for each
of the possible combinations of ch and cl.
2.3 Imperfect internal diagnosis
The basic model presented in the previous section assumes the bank is unable
to determine the applicants’ true type and therefore relies on pure chance. In
8this section, the model is reﬁned by introducing diagnosis.22 When diagnosing
a new customer, the bank receives a diagnosis result (a signal) that is correlated
with the potential customer’s type. The signal is denoted as s ∈ {h;l} and
assumed to be correlated with the true type. Let
r := Pr(s = h|t = H)
be the probability that signal s = h occurs correctly and
w := Pr(s = h|t = L)
be the probability that this signal occurs incorrectly. Thus, the error proba-
bilities are 1 − r and w, respectively. The signal is assumed to be informative:
r > w. However, the signal is not perfect: r < 1 and w > 0. This case is called
“positive, but imperfect diagnosis skill”.23 For a bank of perfect diagnosis skill,
r = 1 and w = 0 hold.24 The other extreme case would be “zero diagnosis skill”,
i.e., r = w regardless of the value of r and w. In this case (which was implicitly
assumed in section 2.1) the diagnosis result is independent of the true, unknown
type of the credit applicant.
Having observed the signal, the bank updates it’s beliefs according to the Bayes’
rule. Let me denote the posterior probability that the true type is t = H as µ
if the signal was s = h, and as ν if the signal was s = L, hence
µ := Pr(t = H|s = h)
and
ν := Pr(t = H|s = l)
. The ex-post average probability of success is denoted as Θ(µ) = µqH+(1−µ)qL
and Θ(ν) = νqH +(1−ν)qL, respectively. The relations between posteriors and
priors are summarized in the following Lemma:25
Lemma 1: r > w and qH > qL imply µ > π > ν and Θ(µ) > Θ(ν).
22The model presented here was outlined in Kirstein/Neunzig (1999), criticizing the sem-
inal paper of Broecker (1990) for not having taken into account the possibility that a bank
may have incentives to disregard the diagnosis result when making its credit decision. The
idea that it can be rational to disregard a diagnosis result and to instead base a decision on
a rule of thumb is based on the work of Heiner (1983), (1986), (1990). His work refers to
signal detection theory, see Green/Swets (1966).
23Compare this approach to Hauswald/Marquez (2000). In the literature on binary diag-
nosis, the error probabilities are often set equal: 1 − r = w, see e.g. Cao/Shouyong (1999).
In such a model, positive diagnosis skill means r > 1/2; this simpliﬁed approach is used in
the subsequent sections to model the diagnosis skill of supervising authorities and of external
rating agencies.
24Dell’Ariccia (2000) assumes perfect diagnosis skill, but distinguishes between old cus-
tomers (the bank has already the information on the type) and new customers (the bank
has to spend diagnosis costs in order to perfectly learn the customer’s type). Other authors
assume that banks only screen with a probability smaller than one, see e.g. Covitz/Heitfeld
(1999). Here, diagnosis costs are neglected and the bank always screens.
25The proof is in the Appendix, see page 20.
9The bank’s decision problem is visualized in ﬁgure 3. The tree starts with a
chance move, determining the true but unknown type of the applicant. This is
symbolized by the darkened box in the center of ﬁgure 3. The bank, denoted
as B, then screens the applicant and receives an informative signal, s ∈ {h;l}.
Knowing the diagnosis result, the bank ﬁnally grants a credit by assigning a
risk class (either d = h or d = l), or rejects the customer (d = n).
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It is assumed that the signal s is the bank’s private information, whereas the
contract conditions are observable to third parties. This makes it possible for
the bank to assign a risk class that deviates from the diagnosis result. To react
in accordance with the signal means to choose d = s, whereas to deviate means
d 6= s. If credit is granted, then the conditions of the contract are governed by
the assigned risk class. I assume the authority can easily observe whether the
credit conditions coincide with the bank’s internal rating decision d.26 Hence,
cd = id is easily enforced for both d = h and d = l. It is excluded that a bank
26Note that this observation does not require the assumption that the authority has positive
diagnosis skill with respect to the true, unknown type s of the credit applicant. In the
subsequent section, the authority is assumed to have positive diagnosis skill.
10demands ih and only sets aside cl.
The bank’s optimal decision not only depends on the parameters π,id,qt and
cd, but also on the observed diagnosis result, as Proposition 2 demonstrates.
For the proof, simply compare the expected payoﬀs.
Proposition 2: Given qt,π,cd,id with d ∈ {h;l},t ∈ {H;L}, cl >
ch, il > ih, and qH > qL. If the diagnosis result was s = h, then the
bank prefers
(4) d = h to d = l ⇔ ∆c > Θ(µ)∆i;
(5) d = h to d = n ⇔ ch < Θ(µ)ih;
(6) d = l to d = n ⇔ cl < Θ(µ)il.
If the diagnosis result was s = l, the bank prefers
(7) d = l to d = h ⇔ ∆c < Θ(ν)∆i;
(8) d = h to d = n ⇔ ch < Θ(ν)ih;
(9) d = l to d = n ⇔ cl < Θ(ν)il.
Figure 4 shows the bank’s optimal decisions contingent on the policy parameters
cl and ch. The upper right system, which is labeled by (4), (5), and (6), refers to
the situation where the bank has observed the diagnosis result s = h. The lower
left system, labeled as (7), (8), and (9), indicates the optimal decision after
having observed the diagnosis result s = l. These labels refer to the conditions
in Proposition 2.
Θ(µ) and Θ(ν) are the intersections of the diagonal lines in ﬁgure 4. Recall
Lemma 1: if r > w and therefore µ > ν, holds as well as ∆i > 0, then the (4)
lies above (7).27
Let me now deﬁne a bank’s plan for reacting to each of the possible signals as a
(pure) “reaction strategy”.28 A reaction strategy consists of two plans, the ﬁrst
of which is the intended reaction to the diagnosis result s = h, and the second
part is the intended reaction to s = l. E.g., the reaction strategy (ln) is the plan
to react with d = l if the observed signal is s = l, and with d = n if the signal
is s = l.
Given the notion of reaction strategies, truthful revelation of the internal di-
agnosis result means choosing the reaction strategy (hl), because this reaction
27Figure 4 shows the case in which the intercept of (4) is greater than (9). This relation
might also be the opposite one, which would have, however, no impact on the main result of
this section.
28A mixed reaction strategy is a pair of conditional probabilites with which the decision-
maker plans to carry out an action, given a certain diagnosis result. Since the expected payoﬀs
are linear in these probabilities, only corner solutions are optimal. Therefore, mixed reaction
strategies can be neglected here.






















































strategy is characterized by d = s. If the bank chooses this reaction strategy,
it is certain that it sets aside the appropriate amount of equity for all credit
customers served. If the bank chooses another reaction strategy, it is possible
that the resulting equity sum will be appropriate, but this is only a matter of
pure chance, a result not ultimately satisfactory to a regulator.
Figure 5 simpliﬁes ﬁgure 4 and shows the optimal reaction strategy choice for
the possible values of cl and ch. Obviously, the reaction strategy (hl) is never
optimal for the bank. This is due to the assumptions r > w and il > ih, Of
course, this result can not only be shown graphically, but can also be proven
algebraically: If (hl) were optimal, then the conditions (4), (5), (9), and (7)
would be simultaneously true. (4) and (7) is equivalent to
Θ(ν)∆i > ∆c > Θ(µ)∆i
which implies ν > µ. However, this is a contradiction to r > w. Therefore, the
following proposition is proven:
Proposition 3: Given r,w,qt,π,cd,id with d ∈ {h;l;n}, t ∈
{H;L}, cl > ch, il > ih, qH > qL, and r > w. Then the bank
will never choose the reaction strategy (hl).























Figure 5 makes obvious that the “Supervisory Review Process”, as proposed
in the new Basle Accord, does not provide the bank’s incentives to truthfully
reveal its diagnosis result. According to the “Supervisory Review Process”, the
supervisor may make suggestions to the bank on how to improve the quality of
its risk management. However, even if r is increased and w is decreased, the
result of Proposition 3 is still true. Additionally, the supervisor may increase
ch or cl (or both) if a bank fails to comply. Yet, this also does not implement
the choice of the reaction strategy (hl). Facing a higher equity requirement, the
bank may switch from the decision for (hh) to (hn) or from (ll) to (ln), but the
structure of ﬁgure 5 remains as it is and (hl) is never the optimal choice of the
bank.
The fear that internal rating may tempt credit oﬃcers to underestimate credit
risks was already expressed by Krahnen/Weber (2001, 16), who demand that
a rating system should take incentive problems into account. In the framework of
my model, underestimation of default risk is modeled as the choice of reaction
strategies that provide more favorable credit conditions for applicants if the
diagnosis result indicates the more risky types (s = l), i.e. (lh), (nh), or (hh).
132.4 Internal rating and supervision
Consider a supervising authority that is unable to observe the diagnosis result
the bank has internally derived, but has access to the bank’s data and may itself
evaluate the credit customers. Denote the diagnosis results of the authority as
a ∈ {h;l}. It may impose a ﬁne F ≥ 0, to be paid by the bank if the authority’s
diagnosis result diﬀers from the risk class d ∈ {h;l} the bank has assigned (i.e., if
a 6= d).29 The supervising authority is assumed to have undistorted preferences:
it prefers to assign the appropriate risk class to the bank’s customers and it
does not impose the ﬁne if its diagnosis conﬁrms the bank’s decision (a = d).
However, the diagnosis skill of the authority is assumed to be lesser (yet positive)
than the bank’s.
Let λ be the probability of a correct assignment of a risk class:
λ = Pr(a = h|t = H) = Pr(a = l|t = L)
Hence, 1 − λ is the probability of a wrong diagnosis result:
λ = Pr(a = h|t = L) = Pr(a = h|t = L)
Positive diagnosis skill means λ > 1 − λ, which is equivalent to λ > 1/2. If
the diagnosis skill of the authority is positive, but worse than the bank’s, this
implies r > λ > 1 − λ > w.
Since s is not observable to outsiders, the authority does not always punish a
deviation of the bank’s decision d from the bank’s diagnosis result s. Rather,
the authority punishes a deviation between d and its own diagnosis result a.
At ﬁrst glance, punishment for behavior that is only allegedly wrongful may
appear unjust or even strange. However, this simply reﬂects the fact that law
enforcement authorities do not perfectly know what actually has occured in the
past and therefore may commit errors. They nevertheless can have an incentive
compatible impact on the supervised actors.30
Despite the possibility of “judicial” errors, imposed ﬁnes may positively inﬂu-
ence the bank’s incentives if the diagnosis skill of both the supervising authority
and the bank are satisfactory, as the following Lemma demonstrates.31
Lemma 2: Given r,w,π,λ,F with r > λ > 1−λ > w and λ > 0.5.
Then, the probability of a ﬁne is smaller in case of truthful revelation
of the bank’s diagnosis result (d = s) than in case of d 6= s if, and
29Note that this concept substantially diﬀers from the “Supervisory Review Process” pro-
posed by the Basle Committee, according to which the supervisor may at most increase the
equity ratio a bank has to apply. For simplicity I assume the authority does not scrutinize
cases in which no credit was granted (d = n).
30See, e.g., Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997).










Lemma 2.4 makes clear that the incentive eﬀect of an authority with positive
diagnosis skill also depends on the diagnosis skill of the supervised bank. A
consequence of this lemma is that, even though the ﬁne F cannot be made
contingent on s, it is yet correlated: if the bank chooses d 6= s, then the ﬁne
is more likely than in case of d = s. Figure 6 shows only a part of the bank’s
decision tree under supervision: to keep matters simple, the exposition is limited
to the case of s = h and t = H.





























1 − λ,l λ,h
qHil − cl − F
h,λ
l,1 − λ qHih − ch − F
The decision tree again starts with the chance move (represented by the dark-
ened box) that determines the credit applicant’s type. If the Bank now decides
to reject the customer, the tree ends. If, on the other hand, the bank gives
credit (either d = h or d = l), the authority A becomes active: if the bank has
truthfully revealed its diagnosis signal, the authority conﬁrms this decision with
probability λ. However, with probability 1 − λ the authority commits an error
and imposes a ﬁne. If the bank has deviated from its diagnosis result (d = l),
15the authority detects this cheating with probability λ and imposes a ﬁne. An
error (no ﬁne) occurs with probability 1 − λ.
The complete decision tree for internal rating under supervision can easily be
developed by adding the supervising technology as outlined in ﬁgure 6 to any of
the end nodes of ﬁgure 3 (except for those end nodes where d = n). The main
result of this section is summarized in the following proposition which is proven
in the Appendix.32
Proposition 4: Given r,w,qt,π,cd,id,λ with d ∈ {h;l;n},t ∈
{H;L}, cl > ch, il > ih, qH > qL, and r > λ > 1 − λ > w.
Then, for a bank with internal rating and supervision, the reaction
strategy (hl) is optimal only if F > 0.
A positive ﬁne F > 0 is a necessary (yet not suﬃcient) condition for the ability
of an authority to provide the banks incentive to truthfully reveal its internal
rating result. To put it diﬀerently: with F = 0, the bank will never have this
incentive. Even though the authority has lesser diagnosis skill and screens only
occasionally, a large enough ﬁne may correct the bank’s incentives. In this case,
combinations of F, ch and cl exist under which the bank chooses (hl), i.e. the
truthful revelation of its internal rating results. Whereas the Basle Committee as
well as Krahnen/Weber (2001) propose monitoring and random inspections
of internal ratings, neither explicitly mentions ﬁnes on allegedly wrong ratings.
Without such, the bank has no incentive to truthfully reveal its diagnosis result
by issuing a rating that equals the internal diagnosis result.
3 External rating
In the previous section it was shown that, if no ﬁne is imposed, a bank has no
incentives to truthfully reveal its internal rating results. Now consider an exter-
nal rating agency which assigns a rating result to the potential credit customer
and thereby determines his risk class. Denote the rating result of the external
agency as x, with x ∈ {h;l}. If an applicant holding a rating x shows up in the
bank, then the bank can only decide whether to grant credit at the conditions
related to the rating (namely, cx and ix), or to reject the customer. Hence, the
bank’s decision set depends on the assigned rating: d(x) ∈ {x;n}. Obviously,
external rating separates the assignment of a risk class from the decision on
credit conditions (or whether a credit is granted at all).
It is assumed that the rating agency has undistorted preferences, but imperfect
diagnosis skill. Undistorted preferences means that the agency has nothing
32See page 21. The proof demonstrates that F not only needs to be positive, but is also
required to be smaller than some upper limit. In principle, the conditions presented in the
proof allow for the derivation of the lower and upper limits of values of F that implement
(hl). However, such a quantitative assessment would go far beyond the scope of the simple
model presented here.
16to gain if it arbitrarily assigns a false rating. This assumption is especially
justiﬁed if the rating agency has to maintain a reputation for good ratings when
competing for potential customers.33 It is fully acknowledged that banks may
also have an interest in reputation, or that market forces may also cause them to
take care of the quality of their ratings.34 However, since the diagnosis results
are private information, they will have diﬃculties in converting these results
into public reputation.35
The intention of external rating agencies to maintain a reputation for good
ratings, however, does not imply that their ratings are always correct. The
imperfectness of diagnosis implies that the rating agency may commit errors
when assigning a customer rating.36 Let me denote the probabilities of a correct
rating as
φ = Pr(x = h|t = H) = Pr(x = l|t = L)
Hence, the probability of a wrong rating is
1 − φ = Pr(x = l|t = H) = Pr(x = h|t = L)
with φ > 1 − φ (which implies φ > 1/2). Furthermore, it is assumed that the
diagnosis skill of the external rating agency is not as good as the banks diagnosis
skill: r > φ > 1 − φ > w. The bank’s decision problem is visualized in ﬁgure 7.
The tree starts with a chance move, represented by the darkened box in the
center, which determines the true but unknown type of the applicant. The
rating agency (denoted as X) then assigns a risk-class. Finally, the bank (again
denoted as B) makes its decision whether or not to grant a credit. The expected
payoﬀs follow the model presented in the previous section.
Compared to the decision problem in ﬁgure 3, the bank here does not have the
option of treating a customer contrary to the assigned risk-class. The bank thus
has only four reaction strategies available, namely (nn), (hn), (nl), and (hl).
The following proposition (which is easily proven by comparing the expected
payoﬀs) shows that banks may have an incentive to act in accordance with the
external rating, i.e. to choose the reaction strategy (hl).
Proposition 5: Given qt,π,cd,id with x ∈ {l;h}, d ∈ {x;n},t ∈
{H;L}, cl > ch, il > ih, φ > 1/2, and qH > qL. Then the bank
chooses the reaction strategy (hl) if, and only if,
ch < ih[πφqH + (1 − π)(1 − φ)qL]
∧ cl < il[π(1 − φ)qH + (1 − π)φqL].
33For an analysis of the behavior of a monopolistic rating agency, see Boom (1999).
34In such a situation self-regulation may even perform better than legal centralism. This
is especially true if the equlibrium between competition jurisdictions consists of suboptimal
regulation, as it is analyzed in van Cayseele/Heremans (1991).
35In the case of relationship banking, reputation arguments are not convincing anyway.
36It makes sense in this context to distinguish intended errors (due to ﬂawed incentives)
from unintended errors (caused by a lack of diagnosis skill).
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The ﬁrst of these two conditions implies that d = h is preferred to d = n if
the external rating yields x = h, and the second condition implies that d = l
is preferred to d = n if the external rating yields x = l. Since both conditions
require that the credit costs be smaller than some positive value, it is obvious
that combinations of cl and ch < cl exist, such that both conditions hold.
4 Conclusion
The analysis has demonstrated that external ratings are better able than internal
ratings to implement the goals of the Basle Committee’s proposal. This is true
even if the rating agency has detection skills for determining the true credit
customer risk-type that are inferior, compared to the bank’s. Internal rating,
if not subject to supervision, will not implement the goals of the Basle Accord.
Without supervision, banks have an incentive to assign a rating that deviates
from the internal diagnosis result.
Banks are assumed to have better knowledge about their customers’ risk-types
than other actuors, such as external rating agencies or the authorities. Society
18can only make use of this superior knowledge if the supervision authority is
allowed to impose a ﬁne on allegedly wrongful ratings. If the authority is not
able to impose such a ﬁne, but only may increase the equity ratio a bank has
to obey (as proposed by the Basle Committee),37 the necessary eﬀect on the
incentives of the bank will not be achieved.
There are examples of local regulation that provides for penalty schemes, such
as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, according to which US banks that fail
to comply with the equity requirements can be sanctioned.38 However, these
sanctions are not strictly linked to a divergence between the diagnosis result
of the authority and the risk class announced by the bank. Without such an
additional regulation, the Basle Accord is unlikely to reach its creators’ goals.
It therefore would make sense to amend the current proposal to make sure that
supervision is not toothless in all countries where the Basle Accord is applied.
Note that the correction of the banks’ incentives does neither require the diag-
nosis skill of the supervision authority to be superior or even perfect, nor that
each case be examined. As long as the authority has positive diagnosis skill, im-
perfect diagnosis and occasional examinations can be suﬃcient to set the banks’
incentives right. Such a mechanism is not yet provided for in the proposal of
the Basle Committee.
Research concerning the Basle Accord should not only focus on the quality of
rating systems, but also the incentives of those institutions that perform ratings
and supervision. Diagnosis theory provides a useful tool for taking into account
both incentives and diagnosis skill in a decision-model.
37See also Deutsche Bundesbank (2001, 31).
38Experiences with the FDIC Improvement Act are analyzed by Benston/Kaufman (1997)
and (1998).
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Proof of Lemma 1 on page 9:
Let me ﬁrst show that r > w is equivalent to µ > ν. The Bayes formula yields
µ =
rπ




(1 − r)π + (1 − w)(1 − π)
µ > ν is thus equivalent to
rπ
rπ + w(1 − π)
>
(1 − r)π
(1 − r)π + (1 − w)(1 − π)
⇔ rπ(1 − w)(1 − π) > w(1 − π)(1 − r)π
⇔ r(1 − w) > w(1 − r)
which is equivalent to r > w: q.e.d.
It is then easy to show that r > w ∧ qH > qL is equivalent to Θ(µ) > Θ(ν):
Θ(µ) > Θ(ν)
⇔ µqH + (1 − µ)qL > νqH + (1 − ν)qL >
⇔ (µ − ν)qH > (µ − ν)qL
Since r > w implies µ > ν, the last expression is equivalent to Θ(µ) > Θ(ν):
q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 2 on page 14:
Let me ﬁrst consider the case that the bank has observed s = h. Then the
probability of a ﬁne is
Pr(F|d = h) = rπλ + w(1 − π)(1 − λ)
20if the bank chooses d = h, and
Pr(F|d = l) = rπ(1 − λ) + w(1 − π)λ
if it chooses d = l. The latter is greater than the former (and hence a ﬁne is
more likely when d 6= s) if, and only if
w(1 − π)(1 − 2λ) > rπ(1 − 2λ)






In the same way it can be shown that, having observed s = l, Pr(F|d = h) >







Proof of Proposition 4 on page 16:
If the bank has observed the diagnosis result s = H, then it prefers d = h to
d = l iﬀ
µ[qHih − ch − (1 − λ)F] + (1 − µ)[qLih − ch − λF]
is greater than
µ[qHil − cl − λF] + (1 − µ)[qLil − cl − (1 − λ)F]
Rearranging this condition yields
Θ(µ)ih − ch − [µ(1 − λ) + (1 − µ)λ]F > Θ(µ)il − cl − [µλ + (1 − µ)(1 − λ)]F
Recall that ∆c = cl − ch > 0, ∆i = il − ih > 0, µ > ν, and Θ(µ) > Θ(ν). The
above condition is equivalent to
∆c > (1 − 2µ)(2λ − 1)F + Θ(µ)∆i
Let me denote this condition as (4’), since it is equivalent to condition (4) in
the model without ﬁne, see Proposition 2: ∆c > Θ(µ)∆i.
21If, on the other hand, the bank has observed s = L, then it prefers d = l to
d = h iﬀ
ν[qHih − ch − (1 − λ)F] + (1 − ν)[qLih − ch − λF]
is smaller than
ν[qHil − cl − λF] + (1 − ν)[qLil − cl − (1 − λ)F]
Rearranging yields the condition (7’); compare this to condition (7) in Proposi-
tion 2:
∆c < (1 − 2ν)(2λ − 1)F + Θ(ν)∆i
For the reaction strategy (hl) to be optimal, (4’) and (7’) are necessary (not
suﬃcient) conditions. (4’) and (7’) is equivalent to
(1 − 2ν)(2λ − 1)F + Θ(ν)∆i > ∆c > (1 − 2µ)(2λ − 1)F + Θ(µ)∆i
This expression would allow the derivation of an the upper and the lower limit
of the values of F that implement the reaction strategy (hl). However, such a
quantitative claim is beyond the scope of this simple model. Hence, the focus
is limited here to the following qualitative result. (4) and (7) imply
(1 − 2ν)(2λ − 1)F + Θ(ν)∆i > (1 − 2µ)(2λ − 1)F + Θ(µ)∆i
Solving for F yields
(2λ − 1)(1 − 2ν − 1 + 2µ)F > [Θ(µ) − Θ(ν)]∆i
Recall that µ > ν and λ > 1/2, hence the last expression is equivalent to
F >
[Θ(µ) − Θ(ν)]∆i
2(µ − ν)(2λ − 1)
The right hand side is positive, hence it is proven that F > 0 is a necessary
condition for (hl) being an optimal reaction strategy: q.e.d.
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